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Trade Flows and Wage Premiums 
Does Who or What Matter? 
Mary E. Lovely and J. David Richardson 
9.1 Introduction 
In this paper we investigate relationships between trade, wages, and the 
rewards to skill for U.S. workers during the period 1981-92. We isolate 
correlations between several types and measures of international trade 
and several types and measures of wage premiums, controlling for other 
important correlates. We find very different empirical patterns for trade 
with newly industrialized countries than for trade with traditional indus- 
trial partners. We also find very different empirical patterns for premiums 
paid to low-skilled workers than for those paid to high-skilled workers. 
The broadest summary of our results is as follows. Greater US. trade 
with newly industrialized countries is associated with increased rewards 
to skill and reduced rewards to pure labor, consistent with heightened 
wage inequality and distributional conflict. The opposite association ap- 
pears for trade with traditional industrial countries. It is associated with 
lower rewards to skill, higher rewards to pure labor, and lessened distribu- 
tional conflict. 
Our interpretation of these results rests on two models. The first model 
distinguishes intraindustry trade between two fully integrated northern 
countries from the intraindustry trade between them and a southern re- 
gion whose factor prices vary from those in the north. North-north intra- 
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industry trade is entirely in differentiated, skill-intensive producer inputs. 
North-south intraindustry trade is the vertical exchange of labor-intensive 
intermediates for skill-intensive producer inputs or finished manufactures. 
The second model is a partial equilibrium model of industry wage premi- 
ums that are rewards for loyalty, firm-specific knowledge, or (dis)amen- 
ities. We posit different premiums for skilled and less-skilled workers, as 
we assume that these labor markets are segmented from each other. We 
use this conceptualization to predict the movement of wage and skill pre- 
miums in response to industry-specific trade surges from industrial and 
newly industrialized partners. 
Our paper relates to several recent contributions to the literature. One 
group studies how wages may be affected distinctively by trade with poorer 
countries and by trade in inputs (international outsourcing).' Another 
group conceives and estimates industry wage premiums and the way such 
premiums correlate with measures of international trade.* Because the lit- 
erature on trade and wages has been surveyed extensively elsewhere, and 
because our empirical approach focuses on industry wage premiums, we 
review here only previous research investigating the relationship between 
trade and these premiums. 
Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988), and Helwege 
(1992) find that industry premiums persist over time. Dickens and Lang 
(1988) and Katz and Summers (1989a) find that despite the stability of the 
ranking of these premiums across industries, they are correlated with trade 
flows: Wage premiums are negatively correlated with imports and posi- 
tively correlated with exports. Using more detailed data on trade protec- 
tion and allowing for endogenous protection, Gaston and Trefler (1994) 
confirm the positive wage effect of exports and the negative effect of im- 
ports. 
Recent contributions to the literature ask whether all trade flows have 
similar effects. For example, Fung and Huizinga (1 997) find evidence from 
Canada that freer intraindustry, as opposed to interindustry, trade raises 
workers wages. Anderton and Brenton (1998) take a different approach, 
distinguishing trade flows by characteristics of the source country. They 
find that increased imports from low-wage countries explain some of the 
rise in inequality among low-skill-intensive industries. 
We make several contributions to this literature in models, measure- 
ment, and methods. Our theoretical models reveal that there are no obvi- 
ous correlations between wages and global outsourcing and price trends, 
once one allows for inter- and intraindustry trade between and within a 
1 .  Lawrence (1996), Sachs and Shatz (1998), Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b, 1997), 
2. Tope1 (1994), Borjas and Ramey (1995), Krueger and Summers (1988), Gibbons and 
Campa and Goldberg (1997), and Feenstra (1997). 
Katz (1992), Kahn (1997), and Richardson and Khripounova (1998). 
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primary-producing “southern” tier of countries that also can assemble fi- 
nal manufactures and a “northern” tier of countries that assemble final 
manufactures and produce the intermediate components from which they 
are assembled. By measuring trade with three groups of trading part- 
ners-industrial countries, newly industrialized countries, and primary- 
product producers-we are able to estimate the correlation of trade flows 
from each partner group with wage premiums. Moreover, using economet- 
ric methods that separate pure wage premiums from the return to an indi- 
vidual worker’s education, we are able to estimate the relationship between 
different types of trade flows and the skill differential. Thus, the paper 
broadens the existing literature by looking simultaneously at the distribu- 
tional effects of trade with both developing- and developed-country part- 
n e r ~ . ~  In the sections that follow, we discuss measurement, and then move 
on to models, specification, results, and conclusions. 
9.2 U.S. Trade Patterns by Trading-Partner Aggregates 
Much of the concern expressed in the trade and wages debate (e.g., Law- 
rence 1996; Sachs and Shatz 1998) has focused on increased trade with 
newly industrialized countries and the ability of imports to displace US. 
production in industries that pay wage premiums, especially to blue-collar 
employees. These imports may take the form of finished goods that dis- 
place domestic production directly. Alternatively, the imports may take the 
form of outsourcing, defined as the import of components or assembly by 
firms who previously may have produced these inputs internally. As noted 
by Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), certain industries have a high propensity 
to outsource because their production processes can be separated into self- 
contained stages that vary considerably in the relative intensity with which 
they use labor of different skill types. These features of production and 
the search for low-cost workers are widely believed to be the impetus be- 
hind the outsourcing of activities, such as product assembly, to newly in- 
dustrialized countries. 
We investigate differences in industrial and newly industrialized coun- 
tries’ trade patterns with the United States by dividing countries into three 
broad groups on the basis of level of industrialization. These groupings 
are the industrialized countries (I countries), newly industrialized coun- 
tries (N countries), and a group of primary producers (P countries). The 
appendix contains a list of countries in each grouping. The trade data 
3. Rodrik (1998) notes that virtually all of the empirical studies in the literature looking 
at the labor market consequences of trade have focused on trade with developing countries, 
but argues that trade with developed countries matters for U.S. wages. Our findings support 
the view that attention to trade with traditional partners is clearly warranted. However, the 
nature of this trade, and its wage effects, may be quite different from those found for trade 
with developing countries. 
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come from the Statistics Canada compilation of United Nations bilateral 
trade by commodity, classified according to the Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC), revision 3. Trade values are expressed in mil- 
lions of (current) U.S. dollars. We aggregate data on U.S. exports and im- 
ports, annually from 1980 through 1994, across products and trading 
partners in ways described later and in the appendix. Virtually all U.S. 
merchandise trade is covered, although it is “allocated” among manufac- 
turing subindustries in the United States. 
For each group of trading partners, we also divide industries into three 
categories-producer nondurables, producer durables, and consumer 
goods-as described in detail in the append i~ .~  The producer-goods break- 
down into nondurables and durables conforms very roughly to a distinc- 
tion between industries producing intermediates and those producing cap- 
ital goods. Raw materials, agricultural, and mineral products are asso- 
ciated with manufacturing sectors that use them as intermediate inputs; 
for example, raw crops are associated with manufactured foods. Capital 
goods, which are all manufactures, are assigned to the manufacturing sec- 
tor in which they are produced.5 
Several aspects of the trade data are noteworthy. 
0 The United States typically trades inputs, not outputs. In 1994, U.S. 
exports of producer goods swamped U.S. exports of consumer goods; they 
are typically three to four times as large.6 More surprisingly, the same is 
true of U.S. imports, although the corresponding ratio is smaller, roughly 
two to one. 
0 By 1994, the cross-sector pattern of input trade with newly industrial- 
ized countries was very similar to the patterns with traditional industrial 
trading partners, and roughly one-half the size in the typical manufactur- 
ing sector. In electrical equipment (SIC 36),  however, newly industrialized 
and industrial countries had become equally imp~r t an t .~  
4. In our empirical research, however, category trade rarely correlated in any significant 
way with wages or returns to skill, suggesting perhaps that our category disaggregation was 
simply too crude. These results are not reported here. 
5. As if the “own-sector” were the major purchaser of these capital goods. The same is 
done for intermediate manufactures, such as leather. Thus, imports of passenger railway cars 
are assigned to transport equipment (SIC 37), even if they are purchased and used by mass- 
transit service providers, and purchases of leather are assigned to leather products (SIC 31), 
even if they are purchased and used by apparel makers. That this assignment is closer to the 
typical case than one might imagine is demonstrated in Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 18). 
6.  The producer-goods breakdown into intermediates and capital conforms roughly to 
manufacturing distinctions between nondurables and durables. Fabricated metal products 
(SIC 24) was the only two-digit SIC sector where SITC trade in producer goods was subdi- 
vided into nondurables (SITC 69) and durables (SITC 81). Computers and office machines 
(SITC 75) were divided in half between capital equipment and consumer goods. 
7. The exceptions are food (SIC 20), where U.S. trade in final and intermediate goods is 
about the same size, and apparel, footwear, and transport equipment (SIC 23, 31, and 37), 
where U.S. imports of consumer goods bulk somewhat larger than the norm in other sectors. 
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0 Trade growth was strong with all types of countries, but transactions 
with industrial and newly industrialized countries swamped those with 
primary producers; they were five to eight times as large (except in imports 
of oil, apparel, and footwear, where transactions with primary producers 
either swamped or rivaled those with others in size). 
0 Two-way trade was, in 1994, a very prominent feature of U.S. trade in 
producer goods with industrial and newly industrialized countries. That 
was also true in 1980 for nondurables. But for capital goods in 1980, two- 
way trade characterized U.S. transactions only with its traditional indus- 
trial partners. Large net exports (one-way trade) characterized transac- 
tions with the N countries-that were only partway to becoming newly 
industrialized in that year, of course. 
0 One-way (interindustry) trade characterizes the relatively small 
amount of U.S. trade in producer goods with primary producers; oil flows 
one way and intermediates and capital goods flow the other. They also 
finance modest net U.S. imports in two final goods, apparel and footwear. 
With primary producers, two-way U.S. trade characterizes only food, both 
input trade and output trade.* 
We use these data, scaled by industry shipments, as one measure of 
trade, “trade intensity,” and examine its correlations with wage and skill 
premiums. We also use these data to create a variety of Grubel-Lloyd indi- 
ces (GLIs) of intraindustry trade.g 
Figure 9.1 presents the GLI breakdown by industry type and by goods 
type. In panel A ,  one can see that intraindustry trade is a large share of 
trade with all three groups of countries.’O Panel B shows a breakdown 
by goods type, with intraindustry trade in producer goods of both types, 
durables and nondurables, being very high. Two-way trade in consumer 
goods is much less important than it is for producer goods. 
Figure 9.2 shows Grubel-Lloyd indices for 19 industries. The industries 
show a great deal of variation in the importance of intraindustry trade. 
Almost all trade is intraindustry in SIC 24 (lumber), but less than one- 
half of trade is intraindustry in SIC 21 (tobacco), SIC 23 (apparel), SIC 
29 (petroleum), and SIC 31 (leather). Although intraindustry trade fell in 
some industries during the mid-1980s, it rose in others and shows no dis- 
cernible pattern in many others. 
8. In 1980, U.S. capital-goods trade with the N countries had the same size and pattern as 
U.S. capital goods trade with the P countries. By 1994, the former had left the latter in the 
dust, especially in electrical and scientific/professional equipment (SIC 36 and 38). 
9. We control for other variables, including industry price indexes, which some argue are 
better measures of global pressure than trade-intensity variables, as the debate over “factor 
content” calculation illustrates. 
10. Grubel-Lloyd indices are defined as GLI, = 1 - [ 11, - IM,I / (X, + IM,)], where X, is 
the value of exports from country group;, and IM, is the value of imports from;. See Grubel 
and Lloyd (1971). 
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Although by 1994 trade with industrial and newly industrialized part- 
ners seems similar at the two-digit level, other evidence suggests that the 
skill intensity of the goods traded may differ." Industry classifications 
span subproducts and processes with widely differing skill intensities. 
Trade with newly industrialized countries may be more concentrated in the 
less-skill-intensive subproducts and processes within the broad aggregates 
than is trade with traditional industrial partners. In the next section, we 
present a model of trade in which an industry consists of two distinct 
processes. The home country trades manufactures with both industrial 
and newly industrialized partners, but the factor contents of these trade 
flows are quite different. In this context, we see that shocks to the trading 
system have different wage and distributional implications depending on 
whether they originate in the economies of industrial or newly industrial- 
ized partners. 
9.3 Theoretical Considerations 
We explore two separate theoretical approaches to understanding the 
wage implications of trade with industrial and newly industrialized coun- 
tries. First, we consider a model that maintains many of the standard as- 
sumptions of neoclassical trade theory with intermediate goods, including 
perfect intersectoral factor mobility. This model provides a basis for un- 
derstanding why the relationship between trade flows, outsourcing, and 
the skill differential is more complex than simple intuition and popular 
alarm allow. Similar changes in the volume and country source of trade 
can arise from alternative causes and may be correlated with either posi- 
tive or negative movements in the relative return to skill. The model pro- 
vides some cautionary lessons for our empirical work, which correlates 
wage changes with volume of trade measures and with intraindustry trade. 
Second, we deviate from the standard neoclassical assumptions to per- 
mit industry wage premiums. Using a general form of compensating dif- 
ferentials to explain the existence of industry-specific wages, we present a 
framework for thinking about the effect of trade shocks on industry- 
specific returns to skilled and unskilled labor. l 2  We use this framework to 
develop methods for estimating the relationship between wage premiums 
and trade flows. 
1 1. Grossman (1982) and Bailey and Sandy (1 998). 
12. Anderson (1998, 6)  concludes in a recent survey paper that this conception explains, 
at least, an important part of measured interindustry wage differentials. The other important 
part is thought to spring from unobservable worker characteristics that are valued differently 
by different industries in matching (sorting) equilibria, as modeled, for example, by Gibbons 
and Katz (1992). We do not attempt to explore this explanation, nor do we address the 
econometric selection problems it raises. 
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9.3.1 
We review here the main findings of the model presented in Lovely 
(1999). The purpose of this formal modeling effort is to capture the re- 
sponse to shocks of a human-capital-abundant economy that trades with 
both developed and developing countries. The economy is simultaneously 
engaged in the outsourcing of labor-intensive production activities to rela- 
tively labor abundant countries and in intraindustry trade in producer in- 
puts with other human-capital-abundant countries. This model of intrain- 
dustry trade in horizontally and vertically differentiated inputs is built on 
Ethier’s (1982) model of the international division of labor and Feenstra 
and Hanson’s (1996a) model of outsourcing. 
There are two regions of the world, distinguished by their proportionate 
endowments of pure labor and human capital. The “South”-represent- 
ing the newly industrialized countries-is labor abundant relative to the 
“North”-representing the traditional industrial countries. Production 
patterns differ between the two regions and factor-price equalization be- 
tween the South and the North does not obtain. The South produces a 
traditional good, grain, and engages in assembly of bundles of northern- 
producer intermediates into final manufactures. While assembly is human 
capital intensive relative to grain, it is labor intensive relative to producer 
 intermediate^.'^ Comparative North-South factor endowments are such 
that producer intermediates are produced only in the North. This relative 
intensity ranking and specialization pattern capture in a simple way the 
relative intensity continuum developed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a). 
The North consists of two countries, “East” and “West,” with the West 
designated as the home country. These countries have similar proportions 
of labor to human capital, in the sense that both produce positive quanti- 
ties of assembly activities and producer intermediates in equilibrium. Pro- 
ducer intermediates and assembly use labor and human capital. As in 
Ethier’s (1982) division-of-labor model, there is an international external 
economy from diversity in producer intermediates. Because we assume 
that there is free trade in producer intermediates, the productivity of inter- 
mediates in final manufactures will be the same in the East and the West 
and, as shown by Ethier (1982, 396), factor-price equalization will obtain 
in equilibrium. For this reason, we are able to treat the North as an inte- 
grated equilibrium. 
The equilibrium is characterized by two-way trade between northern 
countries (East-West trade) in producer intermediates and by outsourcing, 
which we define as southern assembly of northern-producer intermediates 
into final manufactures. Intermediate varieties of differentiated inputs are 
A General Equilibrium Model with Outsourcing 
13. We assume there are no factor-intensity reversals. 
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exchanged by the East and West, generating an intraindustry flow in pro- 
ducer inputs. The direction of trade in final manufactures is indeterminate, 
as it depends on the equilibrium location of assembly activities. If the 
East, for example, produces a larger share of world assembly activities 
than its share of world income, it will be a net exporter of assembly ser- 
vices, visible as net exports of final manufactures. North-South intraindus- 
try trade, in contrast, does not involve the exchange of intermediate vari- 
eties but, rather, reflects stages of production. The South assembles 
producer intermediates, which are produced and exported by the North. 
Again, the direction of net trade in final manufactures is indeterminate. 
We assume that the South is a net exporter of assembly activity and that 
final manufactures flow from South to North. The South also exports the 
traditional good, grain. Its exports of grain and assembly activities fund 
its net imports of producer intermediates, which are embodied in its con- 
sumption of final manufactures. Thus, the model is characterized by both 
conventional interindustry trade and by horizontal (East-West) and verti- 
cal (North-South) intraindustry trade. We turn now to a more detailed 
description of the model. 
Production in the South 
The South produces grain ( G )  and assembly activities (A,) with produc- 
tion functions that we assume are linearly homogenous. Grain is chosen 
to be the numeraire and it is produced using labor only. Because of this 
production technology, the grain sector determines the southern wage. As- 
sembly activities require both labor and human capital. We assume that 
the production technology for assembly is linearly homogeneous and 
twice differentiable. Because human capital is used only in assembly in the 
South, it has the characteristics of a sector-specific factor. Southern labor 
is fixed in total supply and is allocated so that its value of marginal product 
is equalized across sectors. Thus, a change in the stock of human capital 
will lead to a reallocation of labor across sectors without altering the 
southern wage. 
Production in the North 
Because the two countries of the North have similar endowments and 
engage in free trade in producer intermediates, we treat the East and West 
as an integrated equilibrium. The North produces two goods, assembly 
(A,) and producer intermediates, (x,), where i indexes intermediate varie- 
ties. We assume that both are freely and costlessly traded. Assembly activi- 
ties are supplied by perfect competitors using human capital (HA) and 
unskilled labor (LA) in a constant-returns-to-scale technology. These fac- 
tors may also be combined, again in a constant-returns-to-scale technol- 
ogy, to produce factor bundles (f), which are used to produce intermedi- 
ates. In the final stage, intermediates and assembly combine to form the 
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finished manufactured good ( M ) .  Both factors are intersectorally mobile 
and internationally immobile. 
The production technology for assembling the manufactured good M is 
given by 
A4 = min [ A ,  (,I, Cxp j"'"'] , 
where A is assembly activities, which may be performed in the North or 
outsourced to the South ( A  = A ,  + AN).  Intermediate varieties are imper- 
fect substitutes; p measures the degree of differentiation of intermediates 
(0 < p < 1). The productivity of intermediates exhibits constant returns 
to scale for a given number of intermediate varieties and increasing returns 
with higher degrees of specialization, as measured by the number of inter- 
mediate producers n. These economies are external to the finished manu- 
factures industry and each competitive firm assembling finished manufac- 
tures takes n as given. 
As does Ethier (1982), we assume that all intermediates have identical 
homothetic cost functions, implying that in equilibrium any produced va- 
riety will be produced in the common quantity x. The properties of the 
monopolistically competitive sector are well known.I4 Intermediates pro- 
ducers equate marginal cost and marginal revenue, setting a price for inter- 
mediates that is proportional to the price of factor bundles. Free entry 
implies zero profits in equilibrium and that the common value of x will be 
a constant. The price of finished manufactures is the international trading 
price, P,. Free entry generates zero profits in the assembly of intermedi- 
ates into final goods, implying that the value of finished manufactures 
equals the value of total factor bundles embodied in intermediates plus 
the value of total assembly activity. 
Market Equilibrium 
The free-trade relative price of manufactures to grain, the two final 
goods in the model, equates world supply and demand. We assume that 
demand is identical across countries and individuals and that it takes a 
simple Cobb-Douglas form, so that world expenditure on final manufac- 
tures is a constant share of world income. 
The demand for assembly activities must equal the supply of assembly 
activities. Given the Leontief technology for creating final manufactures 
from assembly and producer inputs, clearance in the market for assembly 
14. Because intermediate varieties are imperfect substitutes, each producer experiences 
some market power. There is free entry into the industry and the number of firms is large 
enough so that each firm behaves as a monopolistic competitor. Each intermediate producer 
takes the price of factor bundles as given. 
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activities may be written as A = M. Similarly, clearance in the market for 
producer intermediates may be written as nax = M.I5 
The comparative-static exercises that we review here reflect our judg- 
ment about the most important changes in the trading environment during 
the time period of our empirical analysis, 1981-92. We consider three 
shocks to the international trading system. The first is an increase in hu- 
man capital in the South, which in the model is used only in manufactur- 
ing. This simple exercise is meant to capture the response of the economy 
to a variety of shocks that enhance the South’s ability to perform out- 
sourcing activities, including increasing human-capital-to-labor propor- 
tions, particularly among the newly industrialized countries; the develop- 
ment of local technology and managerial stocks; and the provision of 
supporting public infrastructures. Our second comparative-static exercise 
considers an increase in the relative abundance of human capital in the 
North. As documented by Baldwin and Cain (1997) the share of the U.S. 
labor force completing 13 or more years of education rose from 38 percent 
of the labor force in 1980 to 53 percent in 1992. Our third exercise consid- 
ers demand shocks to the manufacturing sector, reflecting the growing 
demand for capital goods and other manufactures as developing countries 
have pursued growth and liberalization of restrictions on manufactured 
imports, as documented by Rodrik (1994). 
An Increase in Southern Human Capital 
This first exercise shows how growth in the southern human capital en- 
dowment concentrates assembly in the South, increasing the extent of out- 
sourcing between the South and the North. An increase in human capital 
in the South raises the share of southern labor devoted to assembly activ- 
ity, so as to ensure equal-value marginal products across sectors in the 
South. The additional southern assembly places downward pressure on 
the world price of assembly services relative to intermediates, inducing 
the North to increase production of and intraindustry trade in producer 
intermediates. These changes alter northern factor prices, driving up the 
return to human capital and driving down the return to pure labor, while 
increasing the East-West exchange of producer input varieties. These 
changes occur even though the relative price of manufactures falls relative 
to the southern traditional good, grain, to ensure international final-goods 
market clearance.16 This case illustrates the effect of an increase in the 
15. The same results obtain from a more general Leontief technology in which one or both 
inputs are multiplied by a scalar, which would in turn scale the relationship between npx and 
A. Throughout our analysis of the model, we assume that the northern price-output response 
is normal (in Ethier’s terminology, the intersectoral effect outweighs the scale effect) and that 
this assumption implies that the relative supply curve for manufactures is upward sloping. 
16. If final-goods prices are held fixed, the proportionate change in the skill differential 
will be larger. Of course, such a conditional exercise ignores market clearance. 
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southern supply of assembly-it will result in an increase in intraindustry 
trade that is accompanied by an increase in the northern skill differential, 
defined as the return to skill relative to the return to pure labor. 
An Increase in Northern Human Capital 
A second exercise examines an increase in the northern human capital 
endowment. An increase in human capital raises the production of inter- 
mediates and reduces assembly activity in the North, holding the relative 
price of factor bundles fixed (a Rybczynski effect), raising productivity 
of intermediates in manufacturing. Taken by itself in isolation from price 
adjustments and other endogenous responses, this boost in productivity 
would raise the return to human capital and reduce the return to pure 
labor. The increase in producer intermediates, however, calls forth an in- 
crease in global assembly activity. In both the North and the South, the 
relative price of assembly must rise to induce this new activity. In the 
North, the price of assembly rises relative to the price of intermediates 
(factor bundles); in the South, it rises relative to the price of grain. But in 
the world as a whole, the price of assembly-and-intermediates combined 
into final manufactures must fall relative to the price of grain. That is, 
world market clearance requires a decrease in the relative price of final 
manufactures. These effects may combine to decrease the relative price of 
human-capital-intensive factor bundles and the return to human capital 
relative to labor. For our purposes, we emphasize that this decrease in the 
skill differential may occur even though intraindustry trade between the 
South and the North has risen due to greater outsourcing of assembly 
activity. This case illustrates the effect of an increase in the global demand 
for assembly-it can result in an increase in intraindustry trade that is 
accompanied by a decrease in the northern skill differential. 
Demand Shocks 
Shocks to the demand for final manufactures can be treated in the 
model as an exogenous increase in the share of income spent on finished 
manufactures. A positive shock of this sort raises the price of final manu- 
factures relative to grain, bringing forth greater northern output of pro- 
ducer intermediates and reducing northern assembly activity. In the 
South, resources are transferred from the traditional sector, grain, to the 
assembly of northern inputs as the price of assembly activity relative to 
grain increases. These adjustments raise the relative price of factor bundles 
used in producer intermediates in the North, increasing the relative return 
to human capital there. Thus, a positive shock to manufacturing demand 
raises the extent of outsourcing from the South and the skill differential in 
the North. When the source of the disturbance is a finished-manufactures 
demand shock, then outsourcing and the skill differential will be posi- 
tively correlated. 
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Summary of Comparative- Sta t ics Resu Its 
These comparative-statics exercises have a number of lessons concern- 
ing the relationship between the northern skill differential and trade with 
industrial and newly industrialized countries. 
0 Final-goods price changes do not tell the whole story when we move 
away from the two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Skill-intensive 
final-goods prices may be negatively correlated with the skill differential. 
0 Neither an increase in outsourcing nor an increase in North-South 
trade intensity is always associated with a larger skill differential. Since 
both trade flows and factor prices are endogenously determined, unless 
the production structure ties outsourcing directly to factor-price move- 
ments, there is no reason that outsourcing and wages need move together 
in one direction or the other. 
0 The sign of the correlations between North-South trade volumes or 
intraindustry trade and the skill differential depends on the source of the 
shock. These exercises suggest that shocks that raise the supply of as- 
sembly in the South raise the northern skill differential. The initial excess 
supply of assembly induces a reduction of these activities in the North 
and an expansion of complementary producer inputs. These production 
responses bid up the price of human capital relative to pure labor in the 
North. 
0 Shocks that raise the global demand for assembly lead to different 
results for the skill differential. An increase in the northern human capital 
endowment creates an excess supply of producer inputs and excess de- 
mand for assembly activities, at initial prices, The demand for southern 
assembly rises, raising outsourcing in manufacturing, but the skill differ- 
ential decreases as prices adjust to obtain market clearance in producer 
intermediates and final manufactures. 
0 An increase in the global demand for final manufactures raises the 
relative return to the factor used intensively (skilled labor in the North) or 
exclusively (skilled labor in the South) in that sector. 
These observations reflect the fact that outsourcing is one endogenous 
piece in the system, just as prices are another. The most direct formal 
testing of the model’s implications would require time-series data on rela- 
tive wages for a group of countries and measurement of the true under- 
lying shocks to endowments, demand parameters, and so on. 
Given the enormous data requirements of such an approach, we con- 
sider a second approach that uses the interindustry variation in wages to 
assess the relationship between trade with industrial and newly industrial- 
ized countries and the relative return to skill. This second approach has 
the advantage of being both empirically tractable and policy relevant. 
Much of the concern about heightened trade with newly industrialized 
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countries is its effect on “good jobs”-manufacturing jobs that pay above- 
average wages17-an issue that requires one to deviate from models in 
which all similar workers receive the same return, regardless of the sector 
in which they are employed. Indeed such industry wage premiums for 
comparable workers are a ubiquitous fact of life for both industrial and 
newly industrialized countries (Anderson 1998; Cragg and Epelbaum 
1996; Kahn 1997; Krueger 1998; Robertson 1998). 
9.3.2 A Model with Interindustry Wage Premiums 
The existence of interindustry wage premiums remains a puzzle for la- 
bor economists. Wage premiums may be attributable to the fact that the 
industry of affiliation is important per se, as in the case of compensating 
differentials, or it may be that industry affiliation is systematically corre- 
lated with unobserved worker attributes (as would result from a worker- 
sorting process based on unobserved ability), or both.I8 We take a broad 
version of the former approach, treating industry premiums as compensa- 
tion for particular industry characteristics. 
We model the labor market in a partial equilibrium context, incorporat- 
ing the pattern of specialization used in the previous general-equilibrium 
model. Each firm takes the outside wage as given, but pays a premium to 
compensate workers for loyalty, firm-specific skill acquisition, or for the 
disutility from higher effort, longer work weeks, unpleasant or risky work- 
ing conditions, and so on, associated with employment in the industry. 
Firms are assumed to face two distinct labor markets, one for unskilled 
workers and another for skilled workers, and may pay a different premium 
above the outside wage to each type of worker. We assume that the (dis)- 
utility arising from employment in the industry varies within the popula- 
tion and that workers in each labor market can be arrayed from those who 
experience low to those who experience high (dis)utility from working in 
a given industry. Based on these supply conditions, a firm in a particular 
industry faces an upward-sloping supply curve for labor of either type. 
We assume that the demand curve for each type of labor for a given 
industry is downward sloping. We conceive changes in the volume of 
trade as shocks to the demand for labor. Changes in the volume of trade 
arise outside the industry from fundamental shocks such as endowment 
changes in the South or in other northern partners, or in the global de- 
mand for industry output, as previously described. 
The pattern of specialization in our general-equilibrium model provides 
grounds for reasoning differently about volume-of-trade shocks for north- 
17. For an expression of this concern, see, for example, Borjas and Ramey (1995). 
18. Once again, a more direct approach would measure the true underlying shocks to 
endowments, demand parameters, and so on, rather than the admittedly endogenous trade 
volumes. The further assumption we are making is that the volume of trade shocks is uncor- 
related with shocks to industry labor-supply curves. 
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ern and southern trading partners. Northern countries form an integrated 
market equilibrium in which relative wages and returns to skill are every- 
where comparable, whereas southern factor returns differ from those in 
the North.I9 Trade among northern countries involves significant “hori- 
zontal” two-way trade in intermediate goods; North-South trade involves 
“vertical” trade of skill-intensive intermediates for labor-intensive fin- 
ished manufactures. 
Trade between northern partners involves the two-way exchange of skill- 
intensive inputs as well as trade in products of different skill intensity. We 
thus conceive an increase in imports in the same industrial classification 
from industrial countries as a negative shock to the demand for skilled 
labor.2o Northern imports are substitutes for skill-intensive inputs or pro- 
cesses, reducing the demand for skills in the domestic industry. This shift 
in the demand curve for skilled labor moves the industry down the labor- 
supply curve, reducing the premium paid to skilled workers. If the size of 
the industry is held fixed (i.e., controlling for the value of industry ship- 
ments), the composition of domestic production shifts away from skill- 
intensive activities toward labor-intensive activities. Thus, when shipments 
are held constant, an increase in northern imports should be associated 
with an increase in the premium paid to pure labor in the industry. The 
increased premium is necessary to draw additional workers (who have a 
higher (dis)utility from industry characteristics) into the industry. 
Conversely, industry exports to northern partners are assumed to corre- 
spond to increased demand for skilled workers and lower demand for un- 
skilled workers, again holding shipments fixed. Thus, a larger volume of 
exports to I-country partners should be associated with a higher premium 
for skilled workers and a lower premium for labor. 
In contrast, exports and imports from southern newly industrialized 
countries reflect vertical-chain trade based on differences in factor propor- 
tions, and reflected in North-South factor-price differences. Imports from 
southern partners are assumed to substitute for labor-intensive activities 
within the industry, such as assembly. Consequently, we view an increase 
in southern imports as a negative shock to the demand for unskilled labor. 
Given an upward-sloping supply of labor to the industry, this shock 
should result in a reduced premium for unskilled workers. Holding indus- 
try shipments constant, increased southern imports imply a shift within 
the domestic industry toward skill-intensive activities. Thus, we expect in- 
creases in N-country imports to be associated with a higher premium for 
skilled workers. 
19. Even interindustry wage differentials are similar in rank ordering, although less similar 
20. For example, one northern country’s increased northern imports would be the expected 
in size, among industrialized countries (Kahn 1997). 
consequence of human capital growth in the other northern country. 
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Exports to southern partners are expected to raise the relative demand 
for skilled workers, just as southern imports do. An increase in exports to 
newly industrialized partners is likely to be based on comparative advan- 
tage and, thus, to raise the relative demand for high-skilled intermediate 
inputs or processes within the industry. Using this reasoning, we expect 
an increase in N-country exports, as well as N-country imports, to be as- 
sociated with a lower premium for labor and a higher premium for skilled 
workers. We note again the asymmetry between our treatment of I- 
country and N-country trade. 
In the next section, we use this framework to develop a method for 
estimating the correlation between premiums for skilled and unskilled 
workers and trade flows distinguished by trading-partner aggregates. 
9.4 Estimating the Correlation among Wage Premiums, 
Skill Premiums, and Trade Flows 
To estimate the correlation among wage premiums, skill premiums, and 
trade flows, we use two approaches. The first approach modifies a standard 
two-step procedure for estimating industry wage premiums and their cor- 
relation with trade flows, by distilling a pure wage premium and a separ- 
ate industry-specific premium to skill. The second approach estimates the 
wage and skill premiums and their relationship to trade flows in a one- 
step procedure. We are able to account for individual fixed effects in this 
second approach, thereby controlling in some measure for the way that 
industry premiums may reflect industry selection by heterogeneous work- 
ers who sort themselves according to unmeasured characteristics. In both 
approaches, we associate skill with years of formal education. 
9.4.1 Cross-Sectional Estimation 
To estimate the premium paid to unskilled and skilled workers, we mod- 
ify an approach used by Dickens and Katz (1987), Dickens and Lang 
(1988), Katz and Summers (1989a), Gaston and Trefler (1994), and Rich- 
ardson and Khripounova (1997) to estimate interindustry wage premiums 
and their correlations with trade flows. In the first stage of this procedure, 
industry wage premiums are estimated. Our modification of the procedure 
is to simultaneously estimate an industry premium to pure labor and an 
industry-specific return to education (skill). 
Let i = 1,2, . . . , I ,  index workers in industry j .  Let ln(w,) be the natural 
logarithim of the hourly wage of individual i in industryj, 4, be a vector 
of individual characteristics that affect wages, and S,, the years of school- 
ing of individual i in industry j .  In the first stage of our procedure, we 
estimate the following set of equations for each year in the sample period: 
(2) In(wv) = Y,P, + 4 ,wZ + qj,S,wf + E ~ ,  i = 1,. . . , Z j ,  j = 1,. .. ,J, 
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where D,, is a dummy for industry j ,  px, wz, and w: are vectors of esti- 
mated coefficients and E, is an error term assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed. We interpret wt as the premium to pure labor in 
industryj, and w: as the premium to skill (education) in industryj. Be- 
cause our data include 20 industries2' and 12 sample years, we estimate 
240 premiums to labor and 240 premiums to skill. 
We use these sets of estimated premiums as dependent variables in a 
second-stage regression, designed to estimate the relationship between un- 
skilled and skilled premiums and industry-specific trade flows. Let 2, be a 
vector of industry characteristics other than trade and T be a vector of 
measures of trade flows. The second-stage regressions take the form 
(3) W :  = Z,,p, + TIPL + p j l ,  j = 1 ,..., J ,  t = 1 ,..., T,  
w: = Z,,p, + T,,ps + v I l ,  j = 1 ,..., J ,  t = 1 ,... ,T ,  
where k,, and v,~ are random error terms. As discussed by Dickens and 
Katz (1987) and Borjas (1987), the dependent variables in the second- 
stage regressions are themselves estimated regression coefficients. Hence, 
the disturbances in these regressions are heteroskedastic. Because the ex- 
act form of the heteroskedasticity in these regressions is not known, we 
use White's (1980) method to estimate robust standard errors for the sec- 
ond-stage coefficients. 
To control for economywide changes in the return to labor and skills, 
and general-equilibrium factor return changes due to product-price 
changes, we include year dummies and industry producer price indexes 
among the elements of 2,. The elements of the estimated coefficient vec- 
tors p, and p, indicate the relationship between our measures of trade 
and the premium paid to labor and skill, respectively. We estimate this 
relationship for several trade measures. One is trade intensity-industry 
imports and exports, expressed as a share of industry shipments. A second 
disaggregates by partner, distinguishing industry imports and exports with 
countries in each of the three groups, industrial, newly industrialized, and 
primary-producer countries, also expressed as a share of industry ship- 
ments. A third measure employs GLIs of the extent of two-way intraindus- 
try trade in the industry, and a fourth measure defines GLIs for each of 
the three partner groups. 
9.4.2 Fixed-Effects Estimation 
In the second approach, we estimate the correlations between trade 
flows and the skill differential, taking advantage of the panel nature of our 
individual data and controlling to some degree for worker heterogeneity. 
21. Nonmanufacturing is the base industry against which the 20 premiums are measured. 
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We regress the log of hourly earnings on years of education and other 
individual controls, interpreting the industry-specific intercepts as the re- 
turn to pure labor and the industry-specific coefficients on educational 
attainment as the premium to skill. We look for correlations between these 
premiums and trade measures by adding two sets of trade variables to the 
standard wage equation, q., and q. interacted with S: 
i = 1 ,..., I i ,  j = 1 ,..., J, t = 1 ,..., T,  
where all variables are as previously defined and q,, is an error term as- 
sumed to be independent and identically distributed. We interpret wz as 
the average premium to pure labor in industryj, and wz as the average 
premium to skill (education) in industry j paid during the whole sample 
period. The interaction terms Pz and pz indicate the correlation of these 
premiums with trade measures.22 The trade measures we use are the same 
set we use in the two-stage procedure, imports and exports, expressed as 
a share of industry shipments, in the aggregate and by trading partner 
group. We also use the aggregate and partner-specific GLIs of intraindus- 
try trade. As before we control for time-dependent changes in relative 
prices, which themselves may be correlated with trade volumes in general 
equilibrium (including as controls an industry-specific producer price in- 
dex, PPJ,, and the interaction of this variable with education) and for trends 
in the return to labor and human capital that affect the economy as a whole, 
but are not related to trade patterns in particular industries (including 
dummy variables for year, Y,, both directly and interacted with education). 
In this approach, wages could clearly be affected by unobserved charac- 
teristics of each individual. These individual effects could be random or 
fixed. If they are random, an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of 
equation (4) will understate the standard errors, perhaps substantially. If 
they are fixed and correlated with the trade variables, then our estimated 
coefficients for these variables are subject to omitted variable bias. For 
example, individuals with high motivation or high-quality schooling might 
be the first ones attracted to (or recruited by) industries with strong export 
growth. We follow the standard approach to this issue. We estimate both 
a random- and a fixed-effects model and then use a Hausman test to deter- 
mine which one applies.23 The test results always support the use of a fixed- 
22. Including industry dummy variables reduces the extent of problems caused by correla- 
tion across errors from individuals in the same industry, but it also causes collinearity with 
the trade-volume measures, making estimation of these effects difficult. 
23. To be specific, we use the “xthaus” procedure in Stata (1995 release). In our case, this 
procedure uses the Baltagi (1985) generalization of the Hausman test for an unbalanced 
panel. 
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effects specification, so we use that as the basis of the results presented 
here. 
The use of a fixed-effects model is not without cost. This model effec- 
tively eliminates variation in initial education across individuals, and may 
therefore make it difficult to estimate p, with precision. However, fixed 
effects do not eliminate all variation in the interaction between individual 
education and the trade measures, which is the variation needed to esti- 
mate p,. Some variation remains both because individuals obtain more 
education and because trade flows change over time.24 
9.5 Data and Base Regressions 
Our data on individuals and their personal and employment character- 
istics were drawn from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). We 
selected the PSID because it is a longitudinal panel, permitting us in our 
second approach to control for individual fixed effects when we estimate 
the return to skill (measured as years of formal ed~ca t ion ) .~~  
To rule out people with long-term employment problems, we include 
those individuals in the data set only for years in which they had earnings 
and that were preceded or followed by another sample year in which they 
had earnings. Following standard practice with the PSID (see, e.g., Abra- 
ham and Farber 1987), we also restrict our sample to individuals between 
18 and 60 years old who are not retired, permanently disabled, self- 
employed, employed by the government, or residents of Alaska, Hawaii, 
or Washington, D.C. The sample includes workers from all industries, in- 
cluding those employed outside the manufacturing sector. We begin with 
information on 6,606 individuals. After deleting years with no earnings or 
missing information for job tenure or education, we are left with 6,477 
individuals and 41,834 observations for these individuals. Following stan- 
dard practice with the PSID, our dependent variable is the log of average 
hourly earnings, defined as total earned income during the previous year 
divided by total hours worked during the previous year, divided by the 
GNP implicit price deflator for consumption. Table 9.1 describes our indi- 
vidual control variables. Table 9.2 reports typical cross-sectional estimates 
of coefficients for the control variables used in equation (2), almost all 
significant and of familiar size from studies of this sort. 
The control variables listed in table 9.1, along with year dummies, were 
used to estimate a base version of equation (4) that omits measures of 
trade. Figure 9.3 displays these fixed-effects estimates of the industry- 
24. The years-of-education variable in the Panel Study on Income Dynamics has some 
implausible entries. We developed an error-correction procedure designed primarily to elimi- 
nate cases in which an individual’s education declined over time. 
25. As shown by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1998), about one-half of the cross- 
sectional variation in wages can be accounted for by individual effects. 
Table 9.1 
Variable Definition Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Definitions of Control Variables and Summary Statistics 
Food 
Tobacco 
Textile 
Apparel 
Lumber 
Furniture 
Paper 
Printing 
Chemical 
Petroleum 
Rubber 
Leather 
Stone 
Primary metals 
Fabricated metals 
Machinery 
Electronics 
Transport equipment 
Instruments 
Other manufactures 
Age 
Age2/1 00 
Tenure 
Tenure2/1 ,000 
Education 
Black 
American Indian 
North central 
South 
West 
Work limitation 
Gender 
Union 
Number of children 
Married 
Head of HH 
MSA residence 
Local unemployment rate 
Ship 
PPI 
EDXPPI 
Individual is employed in SIC 20 
Individual is employed in SIC 21 
Individual is employed in SIC 22 
Individual is employed in SIC 23 
Individual is employed in SIC 24 
Individual is employed in SIC 25 
Individual is employed in SIC 26 
Individual is employed in SIC 27 
Individual is employed in SIC 28 
Individual is employed in SIC 29 
Individual is employed in SIC 30 
Individual is employed in SIC 31 
Individual is employed in SIC 32 
Individual is employed in SIC 33 
Individual is employed in SIC 34 
Individual is employed in SIC 35 
Individual is employed in SIC 36 
Individual is employed in SIC 37 
Individual is employed in SIC 38 
Individual is employed in SIC 39 
Individual’s age 
AgeXAge divided by 100 
Length of present employment, in 
TenureXTenure divided by 1,000 
Highest grade completed up to that year 
Head of household is African American 
Head of household is Native American 
Individual lives in the north-central 
Individual lives in the southern region 
Individual lives in the western region 
Individual has a work-limiting disability 
Individual is female 
Individual is a member of a union 
Number of children under age 18 in 
Individual is married 
Individual is a PSID household head 
The nearest city has more than 50,000 
County unemployment rate 
Total shipments, by industry and year 
(millions of dollars) 
PI, by industry and year 
Educationx PPI 
months 
region 
household 
people 
0.015 
0.001 
0.004 
0.010 
0.009 
0.005 
0.005 
0.016 
0.012 
0.002 
0.006 
0.008 
0.005 
0.005 
0.012 
0.029 
0.021 
0.028 
0.005 
0.005 
36.362 
14.262 
77.713 
13.897 
13.226 
0.074 
0.016 
0.290 
0.326 
0.175 
0.040 
0.489 
0.153 
1.070 
0.809 
0.622 
0.532 
6.468 
3541 8.99 
21.484 
272.718 
(0.120) 
(0.034) 
(0.060) 
(0.094) 
(0.073) 
(0.069) 
(0,126) 
(0,111) 
(0.039) 
(0.080) 
(0.088) 
(0.069) 
(0.071) 
(0.110) 
(0.168) 
(0.144) 
(0.165) 
(0.067) 
(0.069) 
(10.198) 
(8.048) 
(88.643) 
(0.101) 
(28.390) 
(2.283) 
(0.261) 
(0.126) 
(0.454) 
(0.469) 
(0.380) 
(0.196) 
(0.500) 
(0.360) 
(1.153) 
(0.393) 
(0.485) 
(0.499) 
(2.850) 
(84,787.78) 
(42.908) 
(556.712) 
Notes: Means and standard deviations are for pooled regression sample used in fixed-effects estimation 
(n = 41,834). Ship and PPI (producer price index) are set equal to 0 for nonmanufacturing industries. 
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Table 9.2 Typical Cross-Section Regresfion Results for Control Variables 
1982 1992 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Age 
AgeYlOO 
Tenure 
Tenure2/1,000 
Education 
Black 
American Indian 
North central 
South 
West 
Work limitation 
Gender 
Union 
Number of children 
Married 
Head of HH 
MSA residence 
Local unemployment rate 
N 
R2 
F (45,4251) 
Probability value (F-test) 
0.056** 0.007 
-0.0650** 0.00876 
0.003 * * 0.000 
-0.00563** 0.0008420 
0.081** 0.005 
-0.169** 0.033 
-0.076 0.057 
-0.026 0.025 
-0.007 0.026 
0.039 0.028 
-0.112** 0.047 
-0.197** 0.039 
0.205** 0.025 
-0.024** 0.009 
0.169** 0.034 
0.218** 0.044 
0.139** 0.019 
-0.002 0.002 
3,506 
0.42 
43.7200 
0.0000 
0.042** 0.008 
-0.0436** 0.009790 
0.004** 0.000 
-0.00664** 0.0009420 
0.116** 0.005 
-0.170** 0.038 
0.037 0.080 
-0.186** 0.027 
-0.148** 0.027 
-0.099** 0.030 
-0.137** 0.046 
-0.146** 0.042 
0.123** 0.029 
-0.023 ** 0.009 
0.159** 0.035 
0.185** 0.046 
0.126** 0.019 
-0.005 0.004 
4,310 
0.37 
42.4400 
0.0000 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of hourly wage. Regressions also contain industry dummies and edu- 
cation-industry interactions. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
specific skill premiums attached to different amounts of education. The 
skill premium declines in most industries as the years of formal schooling 
of the employee increase. This declining premium could reflect a variety of 
factors, including lower industry-specific (dis)utility experienced by more 
highly skilled workers, greater locational mobility of more highly educated 
workers, or greater intersectoral mobility of educated workers.26 
Together, these profiles suggest that an important piece of an explana- 
tion of industry wage premiums is differing labor market conditions for 
skilled and unskilled workers. In several industries there is no premium 
for workers with some education beyond high school and in most indus- 
tries there is no premium for workers with a college degree. The existence 
of industry wage premiums, therefore, may be less a phenomenon of 
26. Only three industries have rising premiums-petroleum, primary metals, and stone- 
while one industry-tobacco-has a profile that is essentially flat. 
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Fig. 9.3 Industry wage premiums by education level (deviations from employment- 
weighted average log real wage) 
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particular industry structure and more a reflection of the local industry- 
specific nature of the labor market facing the less skilled. 
9.6 Results 
Our particular interest is how these wage and skill premiums correlate 
with measures of trade, both as an aggregate and disaggregated by type 
of trading partner. 
9.6.1 Two-Stage Regression Results 
In the first stage of our cross-sectional approach, we estimate labor and 
skill premiums for each industry in each sample year. Table 9.3 records 
the results of second-stage regressions in which the estimated premiums 
from the first stage are regressed on import penetration rates and export 
intensity rates,27 controlling for overall industry shipments,28 and on our 
measures of intraindustry trade. 
Most of the extant literature assumes that skilled and unskilled workers 
in an industry experience the same industry wage premiums. So for com- 
parison purposes, we estimated standard premiums (that is, premiums 
estimated without industry-schooling interactions) and related them to 
our measures of trade. The results appear in the first column of table 9.3. 
The upper-left results (“Total imports” and “Total exports”) replicate the 
qualitative results other researchers have found (e.g., Gaston and Trefler 
1994), although the magnitudes are smaller.29 One interpretation of these 
results is that the reward to industry-specific experience is larger in indus- 
tries (and years) where comparative advantage is more relevant (because 
natural and policy barriers to trade are low) and more pronounced. 
Subdividing the influences by trading partner indicates important 
27. The import penetration rate and export intensity rates are defined as the ratio of im- 
ports and exports to shipments, respectively. 
28. The second-stage regressions also contain year dummies, producer price indexes, 
and shipments, as previously outlined. The year dummies, although largely insignificant, 
tend to peak in size in the mid-1980s. The pattern of results is similar whether unweighted 
or employment-weighted least squares is used. Table 9.3 reports only the results from un- 
weighted least squares. 
29. The year dummies bleed away the size of these coefficients. Comparable workers in 
two similar industries or years that differ only in import penetration, with one import- 
penetration rate being 5 percent higher than the other, have wage premiums that are smaller 
by roughly 0.1 percent. Comparable workers in two similar industries or years that differ 
only in export intensity, with one export-intensity rate being 5 percent higher than the other, 
have wage premiums that are larger by a little more than 0.3 percent. Comparable workers 
in two similar industries or years that differ in both import and export intensity, with one 
industry’s rates being 5 percent higher than the rates of the other, have wage premiums that 
differ by somewhat more than 0.2 percent, with the more globally engaged industry having 
the larger wage premiums. Richardson and Khripounova (1 997) show that these cross- 
industry patterns also characterize socioeconomic subsamples of manufacturing workers. 
Thus, for example, industries with higher export intensity, lower import penetration, and 
greater trade engagement have larger wage premiums, ceteris paribus, for both women and 
men, and for ethnic minorities and majorities. 
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Table 9.3 Selected Coefficients (Standard Errors) from Pooled Regressions of Differentials 
on Various Trade Measures 
Distributional IIWD 
Standard IIWD Labor Premium Skill Premium 
Total imports 
Total exports 
R2 
F (1 6, 224) 
I-country imports 
I-country exports 
N-country 
imports 
N-country 
exports 
P-country imports 
P-country exports 
R= 
F (20, 200) 
Overall GLI 
R2 
F (1 5, 225) 
I-country GLI 
N-country GLI 
P-country GLI 
R2 
F (1 7, 223) 
A. Total Trade 
- 0.243 (0.0479)* * 0.0790 (0.172) 
0.586 (0.104)** -1.37 (0.544)** 
0.48 0.14 
20.17 3.08 
B. Trade by Trading Partner 
0.544 (0.186)** 3.31 (1.15)** 
-0.192 (0.288) -3.31 (1.62)** 
-0.824 (0.121)** -0.375 (0.689) 
3.30 (0.548)** -4.25 (3.55) 
-0.0193 (0.266) 0.0896 (1.10) 
-1.05 (1.10) 2.37 (5.25) 
0.55 0.17 
28.99 4.32 
C. Intraindusiry Trade 
121 (33.4)** 183 (171) 
0.43 0.11 
17.36 3.03 
D. Iniraindustry Trade, by Trading Partner 
-93.5 (35.5)** -112 ( 184) 
173 (41.6)** 262 (167) 
-17.8 (30.4) 251 (1 30)* 
0.45 0.13 
14.44 2.56 
-0.0237 (0.0135)* 
0.151 (0.0426)** 
0.13 
2.67 
-0.206 (0.0902)** 
-0.0321 (0.0529) 
0.235 (0.128)* 
0.578 (0.277)** 
-0.0109 (0.0876) 
-0.262 (0.422) 
0.16 
3.00 
-4.31 (13.7) 
0.08 
1.73 
0.617 (13.9) 
-7.41 (13.5) 
-21.1 (9.93)** 
0.10 
1.63 
Notes: Dependent variable is the etimated coefficient on industry dummy variables (labor premium) or 
their interaction with education (skill premium) from cross-sectional wage regressions, pooled across 
all years. Regressions also contain year dummies, PPI, and Ship. Standard errors are in parentheses, 
calculated using White’s (1980) method. IIWD = interindustry wage differentials. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
differences. First, looking at the left-column results by country type (panel 
B), we find that the familiar aggregate coefficients are driven almost en- 
tirely by trade with newly industrialized countries. In fact, imports from 
traditional industrial trading partners are positively correlated with US. 
wage premiums (and exports negatively, although insignificantly corre- 
lated).30 Second, the coefficients for trade with newly industrialized coun- 
30. We do not discuss the panels for trade with primary-producing (P) countries, where 
trade is low and coefficients are uniformly insignificant. In trade with primary-producing 
countries, skilled workers appear to “lose” from deeper export intensity, while unskilled 
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tries suggest large effects. Comparable workers in two similar industries 
that differ only in export intensity with newly industrialized countries by 
5 percent would have wage premiums that differ by as much as 1.2 percent. 
Distinguishing skilled from less-skilled workers provides some insight 
into these results. The right-column results, under the heading “Distribu- 
tional IIWD” (interindustry wage differential) suggest that trade has op- 
posing effects on the return to pure labor and the return to skill. While 
increased trade (larger import and export shares of shipments) is associ- 
ated with a higher return to skill, it is associated with a lower return to 
pure labor, as seen by the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coeffi- 
cients. Shifting down those same right columns, it can be seen that skilled 
workers are the ones who enjoy strongly positive wage premiums in indus- 
tries or years with high export intensity and low import penetration, 
whether traditional or newly industrialized partners are concerned. In 
contrast, the industry wage premiums earned by less-skilled workers are 
insignificantly related to trade with newly industrialized countries, and 
oppositely related to trade with traditional industrial partners-higher 
where import penetration ratios are higher, lower where export intensity 
is higher. These results are consistent with a model in which import surges 
displace high-skilled workers in home intermediates and increase the de- 
mand for lower-skilled workers; export surges of intermediates to fellow 
northern countries require more high-skilled workers and reduce demand 
for the less ~killed.~’ These results suggest broadly that distributional con- 
flict is more likely from trade with newly industrialized countries than with 
traditional partners, as popular debate often assumes. 
The results for the GLIs of intraindustry trade32 maintain the conclu- 
sion that trade with traditional and newly industrialized countries has 
differently signed strong impacts on wage premiums. But they do not sug- 
gest any significant distributional conflict. The aggregate GLI is signifi- 
cantly, positively correlated with the standard premium measure (un- 
differentiated by skill) in the first column, panel C, due largely to trade 
with the newly industrialized countries. The correlation with newly indus- 
trialized-partner trade overwhelms the tendency for higher intraindustry 
trade with industrial partners to be negatively associated with the standard 
wage premium (first column, panel D). However, the distributional effects 
in the “Labor Premium” and “Skill Premium” columns are all insignif- 
i ~ a n t . ~ ~  
workers “gain.” Unreported results suggest that this correlation is driven by foods and bever- 
ages, and in any case P-country trade is much smaller than I- and N-country trade. 
31. Seven of the eight estimated coefficients have coefficients with the signs predicted by 
the partial equilibrium model of compensating differentials presented previously. Only the 
correlation of N-country imports and the skill premium has an unexpected sign. 
32. Such indices cannot be meaningfully included in the same regression with export inten- 
sity and import penetration ratios; these measures are nonlinear transformations of the oth- 
ers. One cannot meaningfully hold two constant and let the third vary. 
33. Unreported regressions that distinguish the wage effect of trade by industry indicate 
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9.6.2 Single-Stage Fixed-Effects Regression Results 
In the single-stage approach, we estimate labor and skill premiums and 
their relation to our trade measures across all years, controlling for the 
appearance of the same worker multiple times in our We regress 
log real wages on the individual control variables listed in table 9.2, indus- 
try dummy variables, industry-education interactions, industry shipments, 
an industry producer price index, and various trade measures. We inter- 
pret the sign of the coefficient on a trade measure as the sign of the cor- 
relation between that flow and the return to pure labor (given by the 
industry-specific intercepts). Similarly, we interpret the sign of the coeffi- 
cient on the interaction between education and a trade measure as the 
sign of the correlation between that flow and the return to skill. 
Table 9.4 records results for the one-stage estimates that account for 
individual fixed effects. In the first two columns, we report results without 
the inclusion of year dummies; we report results including year dummies 
in the last two columns. The year dummies are entered to account for 
economywide, rather than industry-specific, trends. The inclusion of the 
year dummies absorbs most of the temporal variation in the trade mea- 
sures, however, reducing their magnitude and generally eliminating their 
significance. 
The results in panel B estimate the correlation between total import 
penetration, total export intensity, and the returns to pure labor and to 
skill. The sign pattern is reversed from the pattern that appeared in the 
cross-sectional two-stage results in table 9.3, but none of the estimated 
coefficients in table 9.4 are significant. Taken by itself, this seems to sug- 
gest that the distributional conflict described in the previous results is ac- 
counted for by sorting of workers with unmeasured productivity (whatever 
their measured skills) into industries with strong comparative advantage 
(high exports, low imports). 
But this conclusion would be premature. When trade is broken down 
by trading partner (panel C ) ,  the distributional conflict seen in the cross- 
sectional results reappears, although not significantly in the right-column 
results with year dummies. As found in the two-stage results, skilled work- 
ers in industries with high export intensity to newly industrialized 
that the significant P-country distributional results reflect conditions in the food sector alone. 
Greater intraindustry trade in that sector is correlated with lower premiums for skilled work- 
ers and higher premiums for less-skilled workers. 
34. Incorporating individual fixed effects eliminates much of the variation in education, 
forcing identification of the education-industry interactions through those individuals who 
change industry or acquire more education during the period. (As noted previously, the 
education-trade interactions, which are our focus here, are also identified through changes 
over time in trade flows.) Some of the “industry switchers” in the PSID sample may be 
individuals whose industry is misidentified in one or more sample years; research on this 
same misidentification in the Current Population Surveys by Rothgeb and Cohany (1992) 
shows that many, not only a few, industry switchers are misidentified. Reducing this source 
of error, however, is our use of broad (two-digit) industry classifications. 
Table 9.4 Selected Coefficients (Standard Errors) from Fixed-Effect Regression of Real Log 
Wage on Various Trade Measures 
With Year Dummies and 
No Year Dummies Year-Education Interactions 
Labor Premium Skill Premium Labor Premium Skill Premium 
PPl 
F (6476,35299) 
Total industry 
imports 
Total industry 
exports 
PPI 
F (6476,35295) 
I-country imports 
I-country exports 
N-country 
imports 
N-country 
exports 
P-country imports 
P-country exports 
PPI 
F (6476,35287) 
Overall GLI 
PPI 
F (6476,35297) 
I-country GLI 
N-country GLI 
P-country GLI 
PPI 
F (6476, 35293) 
- 14.0 
(2.62)** 
-0.465 
(0.374) 
0.353 
(0.821) 
(3.01)** 
-13.2 
0.756 
1.23 
(1.88) 
1.13 
(1.52) 
(1.11) 
- 10.3 
(4.24)** 
-0.789 
(1.92) 
22.6 
-9.18 
(5.54)** 
(3.19)** 
-879 
(234)** 
- 12.8 
(2.62)** 
A. Producer Price Index 
I .05 
(0.201)** 
8.118 
B. Total Trade 
0.0426 
(0.0295) 
-0.0429 
(0.0632) 
1 .oo 
(0.231)** 
8.1 14 
C. Trade by Trading Partner 
-0.0268 
(0.115) 
-0.0791 
(0.146) 
-0.0710 
(0.0861) 
0.736 
(0.328)** 
0.000593 
(0.155) 
- I .83 
(0.430)** 
0.730 
(0.245)** 
8.118 
D. Inlraindustry Trade 
61.9 
(18.4)** 
0.967 
(0.203)** 
8.117 
0.467 
(2.85) 
-0.269 
(0.384) 
0.993 
(0.851) 
(3.18) 
-0.328 
2.42 
(1.54) 
0.542 
(1.90) 
-0.102 
(1.12) 
-5.36 
(4.28) 
0.345 
(I .92) 
20.0 
(5.63)** 
2.00 
(3.32) 
-602 
(236)** 
1.03 
(2.87) 
E. Intraindustry Trade, by Trading Partner 
-461 20.0 - 343 
(305) (24.6) (311) 
-357 32.8 -169 
(200); (15.8)** (202) 
-116 9.18 44.7 
(202) (16.0) (202) 
-11.8 0.904 1.25 
(2.74)** (0.21 I)** (2.93) 
8.119 
-0.0378 
(0.218) 
8.185 
0.0200 
(0.0302) 
-0.0752 
(0.0653) 
0.0260 
(0.243) 
8.183 
-0.148 
(0.117) 
-0.0645 
(0.147) 
0.000201 
(0.0869) 
0.461 
(0.331) 
-0.0760 
(0.154) 
-1.57 
(0.437)** 
-0.119 
(0.255) 
8.184 
41.8 
(18.4)** 
-0.0788 
(0.220) 
8.184 
13.2 
17.1 
(16.0) 
-3.31 
(16.0) 
(25.0) 
-0.0805 
(0.224) 
8.185 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of real hourly wage. Regressions also include the individual control variables listed 
in table 9.2, industry dummies, industry-education interactions, and Ship. Estimated with individual fixed effects. 
Based on 41,834 observations, 6,477 individuals. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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countries enjoy higher-than-average wage premiums; unskilled workers in 
such industries receive lower premiums. Moreover, in keeping with the 
predictions of our partial equilibrium model, we find that skilled workers 
in industries with high import penetration from newly industrialized coun- 
tries enjoy higher-than-average premiums; unskilled workers receive lower 
premiums. Conversely, and as predicted, high import penetration from 
traditional partners is associated with larger premiums for unskilled work- 
ers and lower premiums for skilled workers. 
The results for the GLIs of intraindustry trade in panels D and F have 
a very similar interpretation. Industries with strong two-way trade links 
pay significantly higher premiums to skilled workers, and lower premiums 
to unskilled workers. The size of these effects is quite large. But it is pre- 
cisely accounted for by two-way intraindustry trade with newly industrial- 
ized countries; other trading partners have insignificantly (although simi- 
larly signed) coefficients. 
9.7 Conclusion 
Distributional issues in the globalization debate are surging in impor- 
tance. At the same time that consensus has grown that global engagement 
has positive overall effects on average living standards and growth, suspi- 
cion has grown that the averages hide great unevenness, with some identi- 
fiable groups even losing from global engagement. In the United States, 
the suspicions seem greatest when trade-liberalizing initiatives are aimed 
at poorer, developing countries, and are more subdued when perceived 
peer countries are involved. In other words, the distribution of our trading 
partners may matter to the distribution of our gains from trade. 
This paper has examined these distributional issues for American work- 
ers in the 1980s and early 1990s. In general, we find that the suspicions 
are supported by evidence, once we control for the usual correlates of 
wages (including unobserved worker characteristics). We find that skilled 
(educated) American workers seem to have received higher rewards for 
their skill in industries and years with high export dependence on newly 
industrialized4ountry markets, and even when two-way, intraindustry 
trade with them is high (that is, both exports and imports). Workers with 
little education seem correspondingly to have lower industry-specific wage 
premiums (rewards for specific training or compensation for industry 
amenities or disamenities) in industries and years where exports to newly 
industrialized countries were large, or where intraindustry trade with them 
was large. Trade with established industrial countries appears to have a 
different relationship to wages and rewards to skills. Skilled workers in 
industries or years in which export intensity was high and import penetra- 
tion low received larger-than-average premiums. Conversely, low export 
intensity and high import penetration with traditional partners is associ- 
ated with larger-than-average premiums for unskilled workers. 
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We interpret these results in the light of models that assume differences 
in the types of trade that the United States conducts with traditional in- 
dustrial and newly industrialized trading partners and differences in the 
types of labor markets that less-skilled and more-skilled workers face. Our 
empirical results are largely consistent with variegated outsourcing-hori- 
zontal intraindustry trade in specialized, skill-intensive intermediate pro- 
ducer goods between highly integrated industrial economies, but vertical 
intraindustry trade of those same intermediates for less-skill-intensive as- 
semblies and finished manufactures between industrial and newly industri- 
alized economies that are not yet fully integrated. The results also support 
a view of labor markets that is to some extent industry specific, generating 
different industry-specific components to wages and the return to educa- 
tion. The data show pronounced differences in the size of these industry 
wage premiums across industries and between workers, and in turn, pro- 
nounced differences in the way trade affects them. Industry wage premi- 
ums for less-educated workers are, in particular, far larger than for more- 
educated workers (for whom they are sometimes 0). 
In sum, our results suggest that both what we trade and with whom we 
trade seem to matter for US. wage inequality. The way in which “what” 
and “whom” matter, however, is complex, and we do not claim to have 
provided more than a beginning interpretation. But we believe that this 
paper suggests both interesting new answers and nuanced new questions 
for the debate about trade and wages. 
Appendix 
Trade Data: Product Aggregation, Concordance, Assignment 
Trade data are a reaggregation from the Statistics Canada compilation 
of United Nations bilateral trade by commodity, Standard International 
Trade Classification, revision 3.35 As described previously data were first 
aggregated across products and then across trading partners. The product 
aggregation constructed three broad types of goods: intermediate inputs 
(raw materials, primary products, and producer nondurables), capital- 
goods inputs (producer durables), and consumer goods. The three types 
were allocated to the 20 two-digit manufacturing sectors in the Standard 
Industrial Classification, either according to end use (raw materials and 
primary products) or according to the corresponding manufacturing sec- 
tor (producer nondurables and durables). 
35. Omitted SITC categories included 27xx, 29xx, and ~ X X X ,  mostly miscellaneous 
products. 
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Intermediate Inputs (Raw Materials, Primary Products, 
and Producer Nondurables) 
SIC sector SITC categories 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Oxxx minus (Olxx + 02xx + 03xx + 05xx + 09xx) 
22xx 
4xxx 
121x 
26xx 
65xx minus (652x + 653x + 654x + 655x) 
652x + 653x + 654x + 655x 
24xx + 63xx 
25xx + 64xx 
5xxx 
3xxx 
23xx + 62xx 
21xx + 61xx 
66xx 
28xx + 67xx + 68xx 
69xx 
Capital-Goods Inputs (Producer Durables) 
SIC sector SITC categories 
25 82xx 
34 81xx 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Consumer Goods 
SIC sector SITC categories 
71xx + 72xx + 73xx + 74xx + (0.5)75x~~~ 
764x + (77xx minus 775x) 
7621 + 782x + 783x +784x + 786x + 79xx 
87xx + (88xx minus 885x) 
20 
21 
23 
31 
35 
36 
Olxx + 02xx + 03xx + 05xx + 09xx 
1 lxx 
122x 
84xx 
83xx + 8510 
(0.5)75xx 
76xx minus 7621 minus 764x 
36. Computers and office machines (SITC 75xx) were divided equally between producer 
goods and consumer goods. 
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37 
38 
39 
7810 + 785x 
885x 
89xx 
Trade Data: Trading-Partner Aggregation 
Aggregation across trading partners created three groups: traditional 
industrial trading partners (the I group), newly industrialized trading part- 
ners (the N group), and primary-product producers (the P group). The 
groups are detailed in table 9A.1 and were based loosely on per capita 
income and judgment about product mix. 
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Table 9A.1 Country Categories 
I Countries (Traditional Industrial) 
Australia Canada Germany Netherlands Sweden 
Austria Denmark Ireland New Zealand Switzerland 
Belgium- Finland Italy Norway United 
Luxembourg France Japan Spain Kingdom 
N Countries (Newly Industrialized) 
Argentina Greece Korea Rp. Singapore 
Brazil Hong Kong Malaysia South Africa 
Chile Hungary Mexico Taiwan 
Czechoslovakia Israel Portugal Uruguay 
P Countries (Primary Producers) 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
CBte d’Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
EUPt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea D.P.Rp. 
Kuwait 
Laos P.D.R. 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Qatar 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Tanzania 
(United 
Republic of) 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Arab 
Emirates 
USSR (former) 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Yugoslavia 
(former) 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Comment George J. Borjas 
This paper addresses the interesting question of whether intraindustry 
trade matters. In their theoretical discussion, Lovely and Richardson note 
that intraindustry trade can occur when developed countries (the North 
in their exposition) export intermediate products to developing countries 
(the South). The labor-abundant South takes these intermediate products 
and converts them into final products, which it then exports back to the 
North. Intraindustry trade can also occur when the same types of finished 
products are traded between countries. 
Lovely and Richardson’s concern is not with estimating the volume of 
intraindustry trade, but with measuring the effect of this trade on the U.S. 
wage structure. To formalize their ideas, the authors develop a general- 
equilibrium model that allows for various types of trade flows between 
industrialized and developing economies. The main lesson of the model is 
that there may be a positive correlation between measures of intraindustry 
trade and the rate of return to skills in the United States. Put differently, 
an increase in intraindustry trade may widen the wage gap between skilled 
and less-skilled workers in the United States. This is the theoretical impli- 
cation that the authors test in their empirical work. 
Because of the general-equilibrium nature of the model, the link be- 
tween the measure of intraindustry trade and the rate of return to skills in 
the United States is simply a correlation, not a causal relationship. The 
authors suggest two channels through which this positive correlation can 
arise: an increase in human capital in the South (which raises the share of 
southern labor devoted to assembly activity, inducing the North to in- 
crease production of intermediate products, which raises the return to hu- 
man capital); and demand shocks such as an increase in the demand for 
finished manufactures (which also raises northern production of interme- 
diate products). The authors also note, however, that different compar- 
ative-statics exercises (such as an increase in northern human capital) 
would generate a negative correlation between intraindustry trade and the 
rate of return to skills in the North. In the end, the sign of the link between 
intraindustry trade and the skills wage gap remains an empirical question. 
The main contribution of the paper, therefore, is simply to establish 
empirically the sign of this correlation. So I will devote most of my com- 
ments to the empirical work. Let’s first start out with the Grubel-Lloyd 
index, the measure of intraindustry trade that Lovely and Richardson use 
in the analysis. This index is given by 
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GLZ = 1 - IxN - I M N  I 
x, + IM,  ' 
where X ,  gives the value of manufacturing exports from the North to the 
South, and IM, gives the value of manufacturing imports from the South 
to the North. GLZ takes on a value of 1 if exports and imports are exactly 
equal to each other, and takes on a value of 0 if the North only exports 
the manufacturing good or only imports it. The higher GLZ, therefore, the 
greater the importance of intraindustry trade. The calculation of GLI for 
the United States generates one interesting result: To a large extent, the 
United States trades inputs, not outputs. 
From the perspective of analyzing changes in the U.S. wage structure, I 
think this particular index is somewhat problematic for the analysis. Sup- 
pose that the value of the manufacturing exports is exactly half the value 
of the imports, X ,  = Y2(ZMN). It is easy to work out that GLZ = %. In 
contrast, suppose that the value of the manufacturing imports is exactly 
half the value of exports, ZM, = 1/2(XN). In this case, the index also takes 
on a value of l/3. 
The point is that the index is symmetric in terms of the importance of 
imports and exports. Moreover, the index is invariant to the actual volume 
of trade. Although I can appreciate that there may be sound theoretical 
reasons as to why, in a general-equilibrium setting, such a distinction 
might not matter, we know that the difference between imports and ex- 
ports does matter, and that the volume of exports and imports also mat- 
ters. Toward the end of the paper, for example, Lovely and Richardson 
report empirical evidence that a higher volume of exports greatly increases 
the wage in the industry, while a higher volume of imports reduces (but by 
a smaller absolute amount) the wage in the industry. The use of the GLI 
masks the potentially important distinction between imports and exports. 
I conjecture that the rate of return to skills is substantially different in a 
manufacturing industry, where all the intraindustry trade is composed of 
exports, than in one where all the intraindustry trade is composed of im- 
ports. 
The authors calculate the GLI for manufacturing industries over the 
period 1981-92, and they link these industry- and time-specific data with 
individual-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
The empirical analysis presented in the paper often disaggregates the mea- 
sure of the GLI across different types of countries (industrialized, newly 
developing, and primary producers), as well as among different types of 
goods trade (e.g., durables and nondurables), but I will tend to focus my 
remarks on the simplest calculations. 
A general specification of the regression model that Lovely and Rich- 
ardson use in their empirical analysis is 
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where w,(t) gives the wage of work i employed in industryj at time t ;  X,, 
gives a vector of socioeconomic characteristics of the worker; s,(t) gives 
the worker’s educational attainment at time t;  K~ gives a fixed effect for the 
worker; and y, gives a fixed effect for the period. The standardizing vector 
X contains a large number of variables-perhaps too many. For example, 
the regressions control for a worker’s occupation. If one wants to estimate 
the impact of trade on the rate of return to skills, it seems to me that 
controlling for occupation nets out a substantial part of what higher skill 
levels do for a particular worker. 
The authors report the initial estimates of their regression model in 
table 9.3. In this table, the specification in equation (2) is simplified in a 
number of important ways. First, they omit the period fixed effects (yo 
from the regressions. Second, they aggregate over all manufacturing indus- 
tries in the economy at time t to obtain a single measure of intraindustry 
trade at that time, GLZ,. Lovely and Richardson motivate this particular 
specification by noting that there may be perfect factor mobility in the 
U.S. labor market, and the impact of intraindustry trade in a particular 
industry would then be diffused throughout the entire economy. 
The results in table 9.3 are among the strongest presented in the paper. 
Intraindustry trade has significant impacts on the wage structure both in 
terms of wage levels (6,) and on the return to skills (a2). The sign of these 
coefficients, however, is not consistent from one specification to the next. 
The analysis reports one particular sign pattern when intraindustry trade 
is with industrialized economies, and the opposite sign pattern when the 
trade is with the newly developing countries. I am not sure I understand 
precisely why this sign inconsistency occurs, and the authors’ attempt at 
explaining the results (which relies on the possibility that increases in in- 
traindustry trade occur for different reasons across different countries) is 
not fully convincing. At the very least, some type of reduced-form estima- 
tion seems to be required to explain the sign pattern, where the wages of 
U.S. workers are related to the factors that actually changed in the particu- 
lar countries (rather than to the GLI). 
Even if one accepts the authors’ explanation, I have a number of ques- 
tions about the regression model. First, the regressions in table 9.3 ignore 
period effects. We know, for example, that there were dramatic changes in 
the U.S. wage structure during the sample period, particularly in the wage 
gap between skilled and less-skilled workers. Admittedly, part of these 
changes in the U.S. wage structure may be due to intraindustry trade, but 
there are many other factors that are probably at work-and none of these 
factors are controlled for. 
A second potential problem-and one that continues throughout the 
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empirical analysis-is the authors’ use of the PSID data to analyze the 
link between intraindustry trade and the U.S. wage structure. In particular, 
I am concerned about using regressions that control for individual fixed 
effects to analyze these types of questions. The parameter 8,can be identi- 
fied if the worker’s educational attainment is changing within the sample 
period. There is nothing inherently wrong with this procedure, except that 
the parameter of interest to the study is being identified from a very small 
sample. Moreover, many of the changes in schooling reported by a partic- 
ular worker can probably be attributed to measurement error. Why not 
just estimate the returns to schooling and the industry wage levels from 
Current Population Surveys (CPS)? This type of analysis-which is the 
standard in the wage-structure literature-would probably give a much 
more robust answer to the questions that Lovely and Richardson ask. 
Finally, the estimation procedure essentially regresses individual-level 
data (the worker’s log wage) on an aggregate variable (the GLI) that takes 
on the same value for a subset of the individuals in the sample. It is well 
known that this type of regression leads to downward-biased standard 
errors if the estimation ignores the possibility that there may be an inter- 
correlation among individuals who share the same value of the GLI. I 
suspect that some of the statistically significant results reported in the 
paper would disappear if the estimation allowed for this type of random- 
effects stochastic structure. 
Table 9.4 generalizes the regression model by allowing for variation in 
the GLI measure across manufacturing industries and by adding in the 
period effects. For the most part, this specification does not provide many 
statistically significant findings. Moreover, this regression introduces an 
alternative problem into the estimation. Throughout the individual-level 
analysis of the PSID data, Lovely and Richardson use a sample of work- 
ers, ages 18-60, who, among other things, are not retired, disabled, self- 
employed, or employed by the government. By construction, the sample in- 
cludes workers in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries. 
In these regressions, the GLI is set to 0 for workers not employed in manu- 
facturing at time t ,  and the regressions include an industry fixed effect to 
capture the “main effect.” It is not clear to me why workers employed in 
nonmanufacturing are in the analysis in the first place. A much cleaner 
approach would exclude these workers from the study-since they cannot 
contribute any information whatsoever to the estimation of the impact of 
interindustry trade. Moreover, it is unclear why one would want to impose 
the restriction that the other parameters of the model are the same for 
production and nonproduction workers. 
Lovely and Richardson shift gears toward the end of the paper, and do, 
in fact, conduct part of the “cleaner” analysis that I have been advocating. 
In particular, using the PSID data, Lovely and Richardson estimate the 
adjusted industry wage for each manufacturing industry in each year be- 
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tween 1981 and 1992, and “stack” these industry fixed effects. The analysis 
is conducted only for manufacturing industries. They then relate these ad- 
justed industry wages to measures of exports, imports, and the index of 
intraindustry trade. Generally, industry wages are higher in manufacturing 
industries with more exports, fewer imports, and more intraindustry trade. 
This part of the analysis, however, does not investigate the link between 
the rate of return to skills and intraindustry trade (or exports or imports). 
I suspect that a much clearer picture would be obtained if the authors 
conducted this type of analysis with CPS data. 
Overall, Lovely and Richardson have embarked on a very interesting 
(and important) research path. Although the preliminary results reported 
in this paper are not conclusive, they are suggestive that intraindustry 
trade may be playing an important role in the U.S. labor market. 
